I have, in my other blog more especially, attempted to outline a fairly a specific sociopolitical point of view. Why do I frequently still get the nagging feeling that this remains inadequate? For a few reasons, I suppose. But one major reason in particular is that one is still confronted with vastly opposing points of view that are unamenable to persuasion by reason. Why is this the case?
First of all, how rational is my own point of view? Classical liberalism and its modern variants are adequate to the task of good governance for the most part. One struggles find alternatives. The premodern monarchy or aristocratic institutions admired by some conservatives? The city-states of ancient Greece? Or can we still profit from Aristotle's taxonomy of polities?
But what does this even account for? Surely one must confront relevant cultural issues regardless of the system of government, even if government conditions their terms to one degree or another? Inter-ethnic relations, gender relations, family life, religion, education and knowledge are of course all matters that precede contemporary liberal society. What disposition must one have to these matters?
At some point ideological questions go back to metaphysical and philosophical commitments. These commitments are then at issue. To the degree that one takes seriously the implications of a particular commitment, one is led to form cultural bonds on this basis. In this way we see modern separation of church and state distorted. The public discourse of secularism is blurred with the private discourse of atheistic naturalism. Being as incoherent and underfocused as it is, however, this naturalism does not manifest itself culturally in all of the uniform (or relatively uniform) ways that Christianity or another religious faith tradition might. It is relatively open-ended. It can accomodate both the educated atheistic urban professional couple and the poverty-stricken broken family that nevertheless continues its condition of poverty with unrestrained sexual infidelity, teen pregnancies, drug use, etc. Because it demands no homogeneity of culture, it can be used by anyone for any purpose.
But on almost all legal issues, I am opposed to the religious right. I am, however, also opposed to the left's historical imagination, in White's metahistorical sense of the term. The Christian religion is perfectly respectable as a philosophical point of view. It certainly has a richer history than naturalism, and there's no reason to problematize it with precommitments to naturalist assumptions in the way that many have. The equal treatment of women is certainly a laudable social goal. How often has it been threatened? The typical social histories telling the story of women's oppression tend to overlook that rape, sexual harassment, and forms of disrespect towards women were duly chastized by traditional faith communities. Labor of many kinds has always been performed by women, especially in the late 19th and early 20th century. Has it ever been true that widespread disregard for the human rights of women has been uniquely problematic? Or in societies in which it has taken hold, are there generalized human rights concerns?
It is difficult to fight through the bogeymen set up by left-wing sensibilities in the intellectual establishment. The left may say that the right believes women are inferior to men and should be subordinated to them. When one attempts to dispell this notion by simply pointing out that there is a disagreement over certain historiographical and sociological contentions, such objections are usually thoughtlessly disregarded as pure propaganda in service of the stealth aspiration, pre-attributed to the disputant, to bolster assumed oppressive relationships. A bizarre scenario arises in which everyone agrees on the fundamental notion of social equality, but vitriol persists.
Liberal internationalism and world federalism are laudable as well. They are nevertheless dismissed by many on the left as fig leaves for neo-imperialist intentions and contrasted with the supposedly more authentic "proletarian" internationalism that will come about through eventual world revolution. Concentrations of business interests and power are also wrongly analyzed as emanating from endogenous features of capitalism (here conceived broadly as an all-pervasive social system and not simply an economic system).
The issue posed with respect to the capitalist/socialist dichotomy is actually much less starkly polarized than many conceive. The old ultraleft position that can only see in every quasi-socialistic insitution (from co-operatives to welfare provision to government ownership) the taint of capitalist string-pulling is simply untenable. The results of reform campaigns are never seen as simply an evolving social consensus, but rather the tenuous product of working class struggle under capitalistic constraints. This is of course backed by the pseudo-empirical evidence of the Reagan/Thatcher reaction or another misunderstood historical example. The post-war consensus broke apart because its institutions were no longer properly adapted to a post-industrial context. The idea that there could be a complex of social forces that does not yield easily to one-dimensional formulas escapes a great many people.
The consensus formulated by heavyweights like Noam Chomsky that, say, "right"-libertarianism (or capitalistic libertarianism) would be a virtual neo-feudal tyranny is nothing but overblown rhetoric. Anything that perpetuates the notion that all those don't agree with Chomsky's idiosyncratic anarcho-syndicalist position are really shilling for a system that is corrupt through-and-through is deemed admirable. It is astounding how narrow-minded the bulk of respected academics have become. Chomsky has himself proclaimed on prior occasions that he believes his own anarchism to be a post-industrial expression of classical liberal aspirations. That there could be no legitimate room for others who actually adhere more faithfully to classical liberal principles in the contemporary mileiu is an utterly flabbergasting insinuation.
Surely if a person is half-sane classical liberalism cannot be a totally reprehensible philosophy.
Sunday, October 11, 2009
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2 comments:
One other note:
Classical liberalism and libertarianism are triangulating political positions. As evidenced by the above post, the position is intended address at least some of the concerns of the left.
Nevertheless, the concerns of the right are there as well, most notably with respect to small government and property rights. The right's disposition towards social and cultural issues is reflected in a more pale light. Is there no aspiration to world federalism in history that one might point to as a source for contemporary internationalist projects? Is not cultural syncretism a ubiquitous characteristic of Western culture? Are there no hierarchies of the learned and wise that one may point to for the basis of social order? Is sexual egalitarianism not a feature of ancient Celtic tribalism or Quaker theology? While we praise small, homogeneous rural communities, may we not also find precedential virtue in cosmopolitan, multiethnic hubs?
Nothing inherently puts the foundational Burkean principle at the heart of conservatism at odds with the Enlightenment liberalism I've been trying to sketch out.
Additional point:
There are some that suggest that socially conservative values would flourish if government intervention ceased.
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